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Beam argues that in the domain of practical reasoning, and especially in ethical
discussions, appeals to emotions play an important role. In his view, moral arguments often
rely on different kinds of appeals to emotions:
- we appeal to pity if we want to suscite sympathy for human suffering;
- we appeal to fear if we want a person to realize that he should have prudential concern with
how others will respond to his actions; and
- we appeal to authority and popularity in the context of law and democracy if we want to
emphasize that the consensus of humanity should have a bearing on moral decisions.
The central problem for the the author is that, although appeals to emotions are
considered as fallacies in traditional textbooks on logic and fallacies, they play a central role
in moral discussions. So the question he wants to answer is when these appeals to emotions
are problematic and when not.
The authors concludes that reliance on appeals to sympathy, prudence, or popularity is
inescapable in moral argument, and can be perfectly valid. In his view, “there are subtle and
crude versions of these appeals, but there is no purer, more rational and objective form of
moral argument that transcends them.” So, they are inescapable, necessary forms of arguing
in moral discussions. Students should learn to critically assess why some are more cogent
than others. Criteria of adequacy could be proposed. Students need to be warned that these
appeals need to be evaluated critically in ethical contexts. Strategies should be outlined for
arguing back against such appeals.

Critique and suggestions
I agree with the author that an appeal to sympathy, prudence, and authority or
consensus of a majority can be an adequate way of defending a standpoint in certain contexts
and that they can be fallacious in other contexts. I also agree with him that these forms of
argumentation are no logical fallacies, but that it concerns forms of argumentation that can be
correct or incorrect depending on the context in which they are used.
Therefore it is necessary to determine in which contexts such forms of argumentation
are correct and contribute to a rational resolution of the dispute and in which contexts they
should be considered as fallacious. In my view, with respect to this question the pragmadialectical argumentation theory developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst in
Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies (1992) offers a systematic theoretical
framework for distinguishing between correct and incorrect forms of argumentation.
The pragma-dialectical theory considers fallacies as violations of a discussion rule, as
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an incorrect discussion move, in a certain stage of a critical discussion aimed at the resolution
of a dispute. A discussion move is incorrect if it frustrates in any way the resolution of the
dispute. It does so if it violates a discussion rule which has the function of promoting the
resolution of the dispute.
The advantage of this approach is that it makes it possible to dinstinguish between
correct and incorrect forms of argumentation on the basis of a clear criterium: the question
whether or not a discussion rule has been violated. Another advantage is that it can be
explained why the discussion move is incorrect by explaining in which way it frustrates the
resolution of the dispute.
Different forms of appeal to emotions amount to different violations of different
discussion rules because they frustrate the resolution in a different way.
I will consider the different forms of an appeal to emotions discussed by Beam and
explain in the context of which pragma-dialectical discussion rules they should be located. I
will show that they can form violations of different rules of discussion and that they can
frustrate the resolution in different ways. On the basis of this analysis it becomes clear that to
be able to establish the fallaciousness of these forms of argumentation it must be determined
in which context they are used and which common starting points and evaluation criteria are
operative in a particular discussion.

Appeals to pity and appeals to fear
The first category described by Beam, the appeals to pity and fear, constitute a fallacy
if they are a violation of Rule 4 that formulates the requirement that the argumentation in a
critical discussion must genuinely pertain to the disputed standpoint:
Rule 4:
A party may defend his standpoint only by advancing argumentation relating to that
standpoint.1
Rule 4 can be violated when the standpoint is defended by means other than argumentation. If
this is the case, we are confronted with nonargumentative means of persuasion.
The fallacy committed by using nonargumentative means of persuasion is that a real
resolution of the dispute is prevented because the standpoint is not being defended by means
of rational arguments. If there is no serious attempt to rationally justify or refute a disputed
claim, the difference of opinion cannot be resolved in a rational way. These
nonargumentative means of persuasion are often aimed at a third party, they are often used as
rhetorical techniques to gain victory in the eyes of an audience of outsiders. This is often
done when the protagonist plays on the emotions and prejudices of the audience.
Playing on the emotions of the audience can be appeals to 'positive' emotions such as
feelings of safety and loyalty, and they can be appeals to 'negative' emotions such as fear,
greed, and shame. Often it is enough to give these emotions 'presence' without linking them
explicitly to the defended standpoint. The audience will itself make the desired connection
with the standpoint at issue. By manipulating the audience in this way, the protagonist can try
to get his standpoint accepted without really defending it.
So, these techniques can be fallacious if they take the place of argumentation. They
can be correct if they are only used to emphasize certain common starting points when there
is also argumentation put forward.
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Appeals to authority and popularity
The second category described by Beam, the appeals to authority and popular opinion,
constitute a fallacy if they are a violation of Rule 7 that formulates the requirement that a
disputed standpoint can only be defended by argumentation that is based on an appropriate
argumentation scheme:
Rule 7:
A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defense does not
take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly
applied.2
In arguments from authority, someone's expertise or special position is treated as a sign that
the proposition ascribed to him is acceptable. The proposition is regarded as acceptable
because an authoritative source says it. To able to use this argumentation scheme in the
defense of a standpoint, it is necessary that the antagonist recognizes it as sound. If the
protagonist chooses it even though he knows that this is not so, he is guilty of a violation of
rule 7 known as argumentum ad verecundiam.
Another body of authority is the number of people who believe something: Something
is so, or good, because everybody thinks it is so, or good. If it is inappropriate to adduce the
premise that the mass of the people is decisive as an extra (so far unexpressed) premise to the
argumentation, then the wrong argumentation scheme has been chosen. This particular
violation of Rule 7 constitutes a variant of the argumentum ad verecundiam that is known as
argumentum ad populum. Because of its appeal to the mass of the people, this form of the
argumentum ad populum is also described as the populistic fallacy.
So, from a pragma-dialectical perspective both groups of fallacies addressed by Beam
imply that the protagonist in a discussion wrongly assumes or wrongly pretends that he is
using an appropriate form of argumentation. A violation of Rule 4 implies that there is no
argumentation, a violation of Rule 7 implies that there is inappropriate argumentation.
As I have shown, the pragma-dialectical theory clarifies that there are various appeals
to emotions, and that to establish whether they constitute a fallacy it is first necessary to
determine what exactly happens in the discussion and whether the behaviour forms a
violation of a discussion rule.
So, taking into account these pragma-dialectical insights, I think Beam needs to
clarify certain points in his endeavor to develop a theory about certain types of fallacies of
pity and fear in the context of ethical discussions.
First, he must clarify the common aspects of the two categories of fallacies that, in his
view, appeal in some way to the emotions of the audience. As presented here, the two
categories do not seem to have much in common, apart from the fact that they often occur in
ethical discussions. As we have seen, the first category of fallacies that appeal to emotions,
the fallacies of pity and fear, can be considered as a violation of a discussion rule because
they do not constitute a rational method of convincing but play on emotions that are not
relevant to the standpoint. The second category, the fallacies of authority and popularity, can
be considered as a violation of a discussion rule because an authority or the communis opinio
is, erroneously, presented as conclusive proof. Something is presented as a common
argumentation method which is not so.
Second, he must clarify why the discussed argumentation techniques are correct in
certain cases and incorrect in other cases. As I have shown, this can be done by explaining in
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which way a particular discussion move frustrates the resolution of a difference of opinion. In
this way, clear criteria for criticizing certain forms of these arguments could be developed
and it could be investigated how incorrect forms could be refuted by counter-arguments.
The suggested additions also involve a critical analysis of actual moral discussions.
With respect to rule 4 it should be investigated in which moral contexts reference to emotions
is relevant as an argument for defending a standpoint. With respect to rule 7 it should be
found out when authorities and the opinion of the majority can be an adequate argument for
accepting a standpoint. On the basis of an analysis of the context in which the argumentation
is used and on the basis of the evaluation criteria that are relevant in a specific context it
should be established how these arguments are used and in which cases they form a
constructive contribution and in which cases they obstruct the resolution of the difference of
opinion.

Notes

1. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992:132 ff.).
2. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992:160).
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